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DEFINING “PROPERTY”:
A DEBATE DIVIDING MORE THAN
MARITAL ASSETS
JULIE A. JUHASZ
Divorce law reforms are necessary to prevent unfair and arbitrary
outcomes. Child support awards and property divisions both illustrate the
sometimes capricious nature of divorce awards. A clearer definition of marital property is necessary to ensure justice and consistency.

P

revious to no-fault divorce law reforms, marital misconduct
determined child custody, property division, and child support
payments.1 Eliminating fault has largely been hailed as a step
toward fairer, more objective judgments; its absence, however, and subsequent lack of foundational principles has led to seemingly arbitrary
outcomes in other ways. Two divorce issues demonstrate the inconsistencies created by the no-fault system: child support awards and property division, especially human capital division.
Recent reforms have curbed inconsistency in the area of child support awards, including judicial guidelines for determining award
amounts. These guidelines establish objective factors judges should
consider in determining support amounts. Establishing guidelines in
defining and dividing marital property similar to those provided for
child support would alleviate the uncertainties and injustices present in
current application of human capital division.

Eliminating Fault
No-fault divorce reforms sought to eliminate the subjective judgments that resulted under the fault system.2 Fault considerations may
not have provided the ideal impartial foundation for divorce decisions,
but they did provide a foundation nonetheless. Jana Singer, though
hardly a fault enthusiast, admits that the field of family law has been
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searching for justifying principles since its rejection of marital fault.3 To
increase the objectivity of decisions, consistency and clarity need to be
reestablished in divorce law. The controversial issue of human capital
division emphasizes this need.
The question of whether education, degrees, job training, or professional licenses can be defined and divided as marital property has
forced many scholars to reflect upon the legal meaning of property in
light of a changing world economy.4 The current world economy generally emphasizes knowledge, and values analytical and managerial skills
above unskilled physical labor. Thus, the human capital acquired
during marriage may be far more valuable than assets such as cars or
savings accounts, making its inclusion or exclusion of major significance.5 Yet most lawmakers and courtrooms have been reluctant to
define human capital as divisible property. Defining the term marital
property is a debate that has divided scholars and legal experts as often
as it has divided assets. In the search for consistency and clarity, an
analysis of marital property and comparison to the child support
reforms may reveal solutions to the ongoing human capital debate.

Child Support Reforms
As mentioned, no-fault divorce theory yielded a system lacking
consistent principles that dictate and justify divorce decisions, particularly in child support awards. Child support amounts were arbitrarily
determined previous to the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments. These statutes required states to specify guidelines for support
awards.6 This new uniformity was part of a number of measures intended to produce more consistent procedure, amounts and enforcement of child support payments. These reform measures were driven by
several studies that unveiled the devastating effects such capricious
award determinations were having on children. One Denver study
reported awards ranging from six percent to twenty-six percent of the
noncustodial parent’s income.7 This wide variation did not seem to
correspond with any objective variables such as number of children,
income level of the custodial parent, or the supporting parent’s income
in absolute terms.8 The study also revealed that a shocking sixty-six percent of the fathers in the study made higher monthly car loan payments
than child support payments.9
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Child support is important because women and children are the
parties most likely to be economically devastated by divorce.10 Child
poverty can be devastating in others ways, such as limited educational
opportunities, higher rates of delinquency, increased teen pregnancy,
and less access to healthcare.11 Child poverty has grown over the last
several decades, and many experts concur that “the case-by-case method
for setting child support awards has contributed to this decline in children’s standards of living.”12
In 1984, Congress intervened on behalf of children to remedy the
lack of statutory direction that arguably exacerbated the problems of
child poverty. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments, effective
October 1, 1987, set forth that
each state . . . must establish guidelines for child support award
amounts within the state . . . by law or by judicial or administrative
action, and shall be reviewed . . . to ensure that their application results
in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.13

The Denver study concluded that the greatest determining variables
in award amounts were seasonal variations, the representation of the
respondent, and the attitude of the district attorney.14 These subjective
factors seem irrelevant to the best interest of the child or the family. The
Child Support Enforcement Amendments required systematic methods
to be developed, applied, and evaluated based upon objective standards
without dictating to the states exactly what the methods should be. The
tide is turning against growing child poverty and noncompliance of
child support orders. Other measures aimed to reform child support and
enforce compliance have been implemented. Many of these policies
have been shown to be effective.15 Uniformity in child support awards
has been successful in improving court efficiency and enhancing the
satisfaction for the parties involved.16 Such judicial guidance could be
equally helpful in establishing uniformity in human capital division and
generally eliminating inconsistent and arbitrary outcomes.

Dividing Property—Arbitrary Decisions
Similar arbitrary application of no-fault divorce law persists in
human capital division as marital property. Courts have implemented
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three different methods for dividing marital property: strict title theory,
equitable distribution, and community property theory.17 Only Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Virginia continue to use a strict title
division.18 The other forty-seven states’ laws have evolved to consider all
property acquired during the marriage to be marital property, regardless
of the name on the title. Yet even this more expansive definition of
marital property does not explicitly allow for human capital division.
The result is a great deal of legal chaos.
Some courts have allowed for human capital to be attributed as an
investment of the marriage, rather than the sole efforts of one spouse.
Other cases have refused to recognize human capital as shared property.
In the 1983 case of Woodworth v. Woodworth, one spouse’s juris doctorate was determined to be part of the couple’s marital assets.19 One year
later, in a case involving a woman seeking similar compensation for her
investments in her husband’s Master’s degree, the judge denied that the
degree was divisible property.20 The justification for dividing the law
degree apparently seemed unjust to the judge who denied the latter
woman compensation, even though she may have had reasonable expectation to be granted compensation based upon Woodworth v. Woodworth. This article does not seek to argue that one decision was right
and the other wrong, but rather that each case seems unfair in light of
the other. Human capital division is an area of divorce settlement that
needs more uniformity and clarity.
At least three solutions would provide greater uniformity. The first
is to maintain a traditional definition of property, considering human
capital as an individual rather than a marital asset. This seems to remain the general preference of courts. Dividing human capital requires
rough estimations of the value of the degree and difficult estimations of
the supporting spouses’ investments, including financial contributions,
childcare responsibilities, and any foregone professional opportunities.
Most judges have avoided this complicated type of estimation and
division. A traditional definition of marital property does not allow for
assets that are inseparable from the individual.21 Human capital does
not have all the traditional properties of assets recognized historically
by the law. It cannot be inherited, sold, or in any other way transferred
from one person to another. However, while human capital is not included in the current laws, neither is it explicitly excluded.22 Maintaining
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a traditional view of marital property would provide a solution to disparate rulings only if human capital were addressed directly and were
clearly defined as nondivisible property.
A second viable solution would be to modify the law to clearly include human capital as property and specify procedures for dividing it.
Many assert that traditional notions of property are inappropriate in
today’s economy.23 The economy has undergone a significant change and
“family law has not successfully acclimated itself to this change, and as a
result, substantial injustices are being created in property settlements.”24
Klebanoff observed that the courts are more likely to classify the enhanced earning power of a spouse as marital property than the degree itself.25 In both Woodworth v. Woodworth and In re Marriage of Hortsmann,
the courts accepted division of future earnings.26 Notably, the amounts
were calculated differently in each case.27 Thus, this definition permitted
the consideration of spousal contributions while leaving the details
of division to the discretion of the courts. Clarifying the definition of
marital property to include human capital appears to be a more flexible
alternative than excluding human capital entirely. Even so, the current
law requires amending to provide courts with justification for dividing
human capital fairly.
Jana Singer provides a third possibility she calls “income sharing.”28
This alternative would pool both spouses' incomes for some time following divorce. If expanded upon and accompanied with specific guidelines for implementation, this may also eliminate the current arbitrary
outcomes in divorce decisions. Any of these three solutions would create
a uniformity which would seem more equitable than the disarray observable in comparing cases such as Woodworth v. Woodworth with
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf.

Conclusion
In the absence of fault from recent divorce proceedings, there is an
observable lack of theoretical foundation. This has led to a greater need
for judicial guidance in certain areas of divorce decisions. Establishing
uniform methods for determining child support awards has focused
the decision on objective and relevant considerations such as the child’s
needs and the parent’s ability to pay. Similarly, greater statutory direction in defining marital property would establish greater consistency
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and fairness for parties disputing human capital division. Contemporary scholars have expanded the term “property” in light of a changing
world economy that values education and human capital. The law may
accept or reject this new meaning, but certainly the change has necessitated clarification.
Julie A. Juhasz, originally from Meridian, Idaho, is a senior at Brigham Young
University majoring in political science. After graduation, she plans to attend law
school and work as a child advocate.
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